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“Commando-style” Terrorist Attacks - Considerations for US responders
By Joe BierlyThe November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India, should get everyone’s attention. It was a well planned, tightly coordinated, extremely violent attack on the center of India’s financial and entertainment industry. Ten terrorists, operating in small teams of two to four men, entered the city using a small boat and unleashed 3 days of hell. The small group caused massive chaos, killed over 130 people, and added fuel to an already volatile situation between two neighboring countries. Their tactics were similar to a military operation - hence the description as a “commando style” attack. 
Let’s first make a few points about the attack itself, then the response, then look at some considerations were it to happen in the US.
The Attack.
* The attack was an economy of force operation. Small teams, well armed, well trained, controlled in real time from another country (Pakistan), using the latest technology (cell phones, Google Earth mapping, GPS) and the local infrastructure to move around.
* Training was intense and focused. Isolation of the teams for operational security purposes, careful selection to get the best operators, given mission orders yet command and control exercised in real time based on intelligence provided by the teams and (unwittingly) by the media.
* Attack was highly mobile. Terrorists used swarming tactics to appear “everywhere” at once. The effect had the local police looking like children chasing a soccer ball - purely reactive.
* Targets were carefully selected. Pre-operational surveillance and rehearsals negated the “home court” advantage of the local police. Targets picked based on political considerations, large numbers of westerners, crowds, and symbolic value.
The Response.
* Police were totally unprepared. Poorly trained, out gunned, slow to respond.
* Warning signs were ignored. Intelligence pointed towards an attack. Dots not connected, information not shared. No one looked at previous attack profiles when developing training.
* Tier 1 Units were slow to arrive. No dedicated aircraft. Uncoordinated reception once on the ground. Slow to deploy.
Considerations for US responders - tactical.
* Gain and maintain home court advantage. You must build ‘target folders’ and do ‘walk thru’s’ of likely targets and do it now; it is too late when the attack begins. Basic photos, floor plans, contact lists, utilities shut off, etc should be included. They must be immediately available to SWAT commanders in the event of an attack. By the way, hotels are almost always targets so you need to liaison with the ones in your area.
* You need patrol rifles in the cars. Without rifles, you will be out gunned at the point of attack. It goes without saying that your officers must be well trained in their use. That training needs to include fire and movement exercises, not just square range drills.
* This will not be a single agency response. You will need help from adjacent agencies. Have you worked with the SWAT teams in other cities before? Do you have common communications frequencies and link up plans? You must divide up the pie so you do not have friendly fire issues (the terrorists could wear police or tactical uniforms making the problem even more challenging).
* You will lose key leaders in the fight. The Indian director of counterterrorism operations was killed the first day. Who will take command? Are they ready to step up? Practice as if you had to do the job of the next senior person, just in case.
* Be prepared for secondary IEDs and attacks on first responders. Fire and EMT personnel are likely targets. IEDs will be used to sow confusion and delay responders.
Considerations for US responders - operational.
* Inexperience at the ‘operational art’ is an area of potential weakness. A good explanation of the operational art as it relates to Mumbai is in the Fall/Early Winter issue of ITOA News. In their article on police operational art, Lt. John Sullivan and Adam Elkus have described the problem very well. While our tactical skills are generally adequate (SWAT team assaults, for example), the ability to control multiple SWAT teams and patrol units from a variety of agencies is a tough proposition. We rarely have the opportunity to practice this yet skill at this operational art will be what ultimately decides the success or failure of our response.
* We must process and disseminate real time intelligence to our responders. This is not ‘dispatch’, rather it requires a team of analysts looking at events as they happen, all the while factoring in the knowledge gleaned from in depth study of similar attacks, and disseminating their analysis to the field commanders. The terrorists in Mumbai were exceptionally good at this; we must be better.
* We must contain the problem and isolate the terrorists. Not just physically, but also from their source of intelligence and direction. We must think of the city as a battlefield and develop control measures that enable us to proactively take away the mobility that the terrorists need to be successful.
* Perhaps most importantly, patrol officers will bear the brunt of fighting in the first few hours of an attack. SWAT teams will not appear until later in the battle; patrol must get it right (a serious shortcoming in India) or it will be extremely difficult to gain control later. This goes to the heart of patrol training: they must be able to conduct tactical entries, cordon off an area, man roadblocks and ambushes, maneuver tactically, and fire with precision. And for patrol, this is truly a “come as you are” battle. They will fight with the equipment they have using the techniques they have practiced.
In summary, I would like to quote a good friend and highly respected warrior in this fight. Chief Jeff Chudwin, President of the Illinois Tactical Officers Association, puts it this way, “If you think this is just an isolated event in India that doesn’t matter to you, then WAKE UP!” We need to train accordingly.
Joe Bierly is President of CTC, Inc, a company dedicated to training state and local law enforcement to prevent and/or respond to an act of terrorism. He is a former officer of Marines and has trained over 12,000 law enforcement officers in just the past three years. He can be reached via his web site: www.counterterrortraining.com
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